

Falcon Ledger Lending - Implementation Report

Falcon Team

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Figure 1: Falcon Logo

Network: Falcon Ledger Testnet (network ID 1001)

RPC: `http://46.224.0.140:6005`

Status: Permissionless borrow, repay, and liquidation verified; HF monitor daemon deployed

1 Falcon Ledger Lending - Implementation Report

Date: 2026-07-14

Network: Falcon Ledger Testnet (network ID 1001, RPC `http://46.224.0.140:6005`)

Status: End-to-end supply, permissionless borrow, repay, and liquidation verified on-ledger (coordinator E2E scripts + portal `/lend`). HF monitor daemon deployed on coordinator.

Borrowers do not need a broker. With `LendingPermissionless` enabled on testnet (live since ledger ~126464), borrow is **collateral-only**: post FALCON at $\geq 150\%$ health factor, sign `LoanSet` yourself - no broker co-sign, no broker first-loss cover, no server secret. Legacy broker co-sign below is **historical only** (pre-permissionless).

1.1 1. Executive summary

Falcon Ledger lending is built on upstream **XRPL XLS-66** primitives (`SingleAssetVault`, `LendingProtocol`, `MPTokensV1`) plus `qXRP` extensions:

- **ClaimLPReward** - Proof-of-Participation LP epoch emissions (FALCON)
- **LendingCollateral** - FALCON collateral locked in `LoanSet`
- **LendingPermissionless** - collateral-only borrow without broker `CounterpartySignature`; permissionless liquidation

The **protocol implementation** lives in the `qXRP` repository; the **user-facing lending loop** is wired in the `qXRP-faucet-wallet` portal at `/lend`.

Capability	Portal	On-chain
Supply F-USDC to vault	[PASS] <code>VaultDeposit</code>	[PASS]
Borrow F-USDC (permissionless - current)	[PASS] <code>LoanSet</code> + FALCON collateral	[PASS] <code>LendingPermissionless</code> live on testnet
Borrow F-USDC (legacy broker - retired)	Optional co-sign path in code	Pre-July 2026 only; not required
Repay loan	[PASS] <code>LoanPay</code> (Pay full amount)	[PASS]
Withdraw supply	[PASS] <code>VaultWithdraw</code>	[PASS]
Claim LP epoch rewards	[PASS] <code>ClaimLPReward</code>	[PASS] FALCON (PoPL)
FALCON collateral in <code>LoanSet</code>	[PASS]	[PASS] <code>LendingCollateral</code>
Health factor display (AMM price)	[PASS] borrow preview + Positions + risk monitor	UI + daemon
On-chain liquidation / impairment	[PASS] <code>LoanManage</code> + HF monitor daemon	[PASS] anyone can default on HF breach or late payment
Borrow / repay / claim / withdraw preflight	[PASS] <code>/api/lend/*-preflight</code>	simulate before sign
Multi-loan Positions UI	[PASS] loan selector	filters paid/closed loans

1.1.1 Economics

- **LP interest:** `LoanPay` returns principal + interest in **F-USDC** to the vault. LP share value rises - there is no separate interest claim transaction.
- **LP emissions:** `ClaimLPReward` distributes **FALCON** from the epoch PoPL participation split.
- **Liquidation:** on default, the **liquidator receives FALCON collateral**. The vault books collateral value at AMM price (`collateralVaultValue`); any residual shortfall reduces vault F-USDC accounting. LPs are not paid out in FALCON on default.

Liquidity in the lend pool is **real F-USDC** (QUC IOU from issuer `rsJoDhjVV78jr6huHxKjtT8uG8RGeGmd1N`), not bootstrap-minted supply.

Verified permissionless E2E (2026-07-14): borrow **5 F-USDC** + repay **5.000069** (`tesSUCCESS`); HF-breach liquidation with third-party `LoanManage` default (`tesSUCCESS`). See Section7.

Historical (legacy broker path, 2026-07-10): wallet `rwYXAAxe7unkEwPVFWMbyzXE2ajG3juqR` - borrow 10 F-USDC with broker co-sign; repay **10.000137** F-USDC.

1.2 2. Architecture

flowchart TB

```

subgraph Portal["Falcon portal (qXRP-faucet-wallet)"]
  LendUI["/lend UI"]
  OverviewAPI["GET /api/lend/overview"]
  PreflightAPI["POST /api/lend/*-preflight"]
  CosignAPI["POST /api/lend/cosign (legacy)"]
  LoanManageAPI["POST /api/lend/loan-manage"]
  SubmitAPI["POST /api/wallet/submit"]
  SignClient["falcon-lend-tx-sign.ts (browser WASM)"]
end

subgraph Server["Vercel / Node server"]
  SignerProxy["Signer proxy (node1 :3001)"]
  BrokerSecret["TESTNET_LENDING_BROKER_SECRET (legacy)"]
end

```

```

    HFMonitor["lend-hf-monitor.py (coordinator)"]
end

subgraph Chain["Falcon Ledger (xrpld)"]
    Vault["SingleAssetVault"]
    Broker["LoanBroker"]
    Loan["Loan objects"]
    POP["ClaimLPReward (PoP)"]
    Perm["LendingPermissionless"]
end

LendUI --> SignClient
LendUI --> OverviewAPI
LendUI --> PreflightAPI
LendUI --> SubmitAPI
LendUI -. -> CosignAPI
OverviewAPI --> Chain
CosignAPI --> SignerProxy
SignerProxy --> BrokerSecret
HFMonitor --> LoanManageAPI
LoanManageAPI --> SignerProxy
SubmitAPI --> Chain
SignClient --> SubmitAPI
Vault --> Broker
Broker --> Loan
Vault --> POP
Perm --> Loan

```

1.2.1 Repositories

Repo	Role
qXRP	xrpld fork: transactors, LendingHelpers , LendingPermissionless , HF monitor scripts, fleet amendment enablement
qXRP-faucet-wallet	Portal: /lend UI, overview aggregation, preflight APIs, client tx signing, optional broker co-sign

1.2.2 Amendments (enable order)

1. **MPTokensV1** - vault share tokens (MPT) for LP positions
2. **SingleAssetVault** - VaultCreate, VaultDeposit, VaultWithdraw
3. **LendingProtocol** - LoanBrokerSet, LoanSet, LoanPay, LoanManage
4. **LendingCollateral** - Collateral field on LoanSet; FALCON locked on-chain
5. **LendingPermissionless** - collateral-only borrow; permissionless LoanManage default

Fleet scripts: qXRP/scripts/enable-lending-fleet.sh, qXRP/scripts/enable-lending-permissionless-fleet.sh.

1.3 3. On-chain objects (testnet)

Authoritative manifest: `qXRP-faucet-wallet/public/config/lending.json`

Item	Value
Network ID	1001
F-USDC currency	QUC
F-USDC issuer	rsJoDhjVV78jr6huHxKjtT8uG8RGeGmd1N
Vault ID	0DB363B417A560EDD7EA8306188F5592F2388A054BF7F6AC1FB5A99A30BC9
Loan broker ID	0DF028DFE8928921B9474B5EB09531E1E7A3655441C53ECFECF41C82F374D
Broker owner (legacy)	rJePmBhHoerhB4gJPAPEqvVBgQ7xbmY6bh - not a borrow gate once permissionless is live
Interest	500 tenth-bips = 5% APR
Payment interval	86400 s (1 day)
Payment total	1 (single-installment test loans)
Grace period	3600 s (1 hour)

1.3.1 Collateral constants (`LendingHelpers.h`)

Constant	Value	Meaning
<code>kPermissionlessMinCollateralBps</code>	15000	Min HF 1.5 at borrow (150% collateralization)
<code>kPermissionlessLiquidationHfBps</code>	11000	Liquidatable when HF < 1.1

Price source: FALCON/F-USDC AMM mid. Loans without broker co-sign carry `lsfLoanPermissionless`.

1.4 4. Protocol rules

1.4.1 4.1 Vault (supply side)

- **VaultDeposit** - LP sends F-USDC; receives vault share MPT.
- **VaultWithdraw** - LP burns share MPT; receives F-USDC (FCFS).
- **ClaimLPReward** - LP claims FALCON epoch emission by vault share balance.

1.4.2 4.2 Permissionless borrow (`LendingPermissionless` + `LendingCollateral`)

- **LoanSet** - borrower signs only; includes `Collateral` (FALCON drops); no `CounterpartySignature`.
- `Lending::checkPermissionlessCollateral` enforces HF ≥ 1.5 at AMM price.
- Broker cover check is skipped; loan flagged `lsfLoanPermissionless`.

1.4.3 4.3 Legacy broker borrow (retired - historical reference only)

Not used on testnet after `LendingPermissionless` fleet enable. Documented for protocol completeness only.

- **LoanSet** - previously required broker `CounterpartySignature` and `CoverAvailable` $\geq 1\%$ x debt.
- **LoanBrokerCoverDeposit** - operator posted F-USDC first-loss cover.

1.4.4 4.4 Loan lifecycle

- **LoanPay** - installment must be $\geq$ periodic payment (principal + interest/fees). Principal-only -> `tecINSUFFICIENT_PAYMENT`.

- **LoanManage (permissionless)** - any account may:
 - impair when HF < 1.1
 - default when HF < 1.1 **or** payment past grace period
- **Default settlement (defaultPermissionlessLoan):**
 1. Transfer FALCON collateral to liquidator
 2. Credit vault `AssetsAvailable` by collateral value at AMM price (up to debt owed)
 3. Reduce vault `AssetsTotal` by residual F-USDC shortfall

1.4.5 4.5 Rate encoding

1 tenth-bip = 0.0001%; 100,000 tenth-bips = 100%.

1.5 5. Portal implementation

1.5.1 5.1 UI (/lend)

Tab	Panel	Transaction
Overview	Pool stats, APY, risk monitor	Read-only
Supply	<code>LendSupplyPanel</code>	<code>VaultDeposit</code>
Borrow	<code>LendBorrowPanel</code>	<code>LoanSet</code>
Positions	<code>LendPositionsPanel</code>	<code>VaultWithdraw</code> , <code>LoanPay</code> , <code>ClaimLPReward</code>

When `protocol.lendingPermissionless` && `protocol.lendingCollateral`, borrow skips co-sign and shows permissionless copy.

1.5.2 5.2 API routes

Route	Purpose
GET <code>/api/lend/overview</code>	Vault, broker, epoch/PoP, AMM price, loans, LP positions, amendment flags
POST <code>/api/lend/borrow-preflight</code>	Collateral HF, vault liquidity, cosign requirement
POST <code>/api/lend/repay-preflight</code>	Installment + wallet balance
POST <code>/api/lend/claim-preflight</code>	Claim eligibility
POST <code>/api/lend/withdraw-preflight</code>	Share balance + vault utilization
POST <code>/api/lend/supply-preflight</code>	F-USDC balance + trust line
GET <code>/api/lend/risk-monitor</code>	Fleet-wide HF scan
POST <code>/api/lend/loan-manage</code>	HF daemon / ops: <code>impair</code> / <code>unimpair</code> / <code>default</code>
POST <code>/api/lend/cosign</code>	Legacy testnet broker co-sign
POST <code>/api/wallet/submit</code>	Submit signed <code>tx_blob</code>

1.5.3 5.3 Client transaction signing (`falcon-lend-tx-sign.ts`)

Function	Transaction
<code>signVaultDepositTx</code>	<code>VaultDeposit</code>
<code>signVaultWithdrawTx</code>	<code>VaultWithdraw</code>
<code>signClaimLPRewardTx</code>	<code>ClaimLPReward</code>
<code>signLoanSetBorrowerTx</code>	<code>LoanSet</code>
<code>signLoanPayTx</code>	<code>LoanPay</code>

1.5.4 5.4 Error UX (`lend-borrow-errors.ts`)

- `borrowBlockedReason` - skips broker cover when permissionless; checks cosign only on legacy path
 - `repayBlockedReason` / `fullRepayAmount` - installment-aware repay
 - `collateralBlockedReason` (`lend-collateral.ts`) - 150% min collateral at AMM price
-

1.6 6. End-to-end flows

1.6.1 6.1 Supply

1. User holds F-USDC + trust line
2. Lend -> Supply -> passkey -> `VaultDeposit`
3. Vault share MPT received; `AssetsAvailable` increases

1.6.2 6.2 Borrow (permissionless - target path)

1. Portal checks collateral HF ≥ 1.5 , vault liquidity (`borrow-preflight`)
2. Borrower signs `LoanSet` with `Collateral` - no co-sign
3. Submit -> F-USDC to borrower; FALCON locked on loan

1.6.3 6.3 Borrow (legacy broker - retired)

Historical path only. Permissionless borrowers **skip** broker cover and co-sign entirely.

1.6.4 6.4 Repay

1. UI auto-fills exact `PeriodicPayment` (e.g. 10.000137)
2. `LoanPay` -> F-USDC to vault (LP yield via share value)

1.6.5 6.5 Claim LP rewards

`ClaimLPReward` -> FALCON from epoch emission.

1.6.6 6.6 Liquidation

`lend-hf-monitor.py` on coordinator scans loans -> `POST /api/lend/loan-manage` with `default` or `impair`. Any account can also submit `LoanManage` on permissionless loans when eligible.

1.7 7. End-to-end test program (coordinator)

All permissionless lending E2E tests run **on-ledger** against live testnet RPC (`http://46.224.0.140:6005`) from the **coordinator** (`root@46.224.0.140`) using admin RPC signing. No portal passkey or broker co-sign is required for these scripts.

1.7.1 7.1 Fleet and amendment status

Item	Value
Docker image	qxrp/xrppld:lending-permissionless (commits ce6c03319 feature, 90d14366b E2E fixes)
Fleet	7/7 validators upgraded via bin/install/rolling-upgrade-fleet.sh
LendingPermissionless	Enabled at flag ledger ~ 126464 (5/5 votes + 15-min hold)
Coordinator container	qxrp-full
Validated ledger (report date)	~ 130168

1.7.2 7.2 E2E scripts (qXRP/scripts/)

Script	Purpose	Exit criteria
lend-e2e-permissionless.py	Supply (optional) -> permissionless borrow -> repay	All steps testSUCCESS
lend-e2e-liquidation.py	Borrow -> AMM price shock -> LoanManage default	Liquidator receives FALCON collateral
lend-hf-monitor.py	HF + payment-default enforcement daemon	LoanManage when HF < 1.1 or late payment
deploy-lend-hf-monitor.sh	Install systemd unit qxrp-lend-hf-monitor.service	Service active on coordinator

Run (coordinator):

```
python3 /root/qXRP/scripts/lend-e2e-permissionless.py
python3 /root/qXRP/scripts/lend-e2e-liquidation.py
python3 /var/lib/qxrp-lending/lend-hf-monitor.py --once --dry-run
```

1.7.3 7.3 Test harness design

Each E2E script:

1. Loads state from /var/lib/qxrp-stables/stables_state.json, lending_state.json, /root/qxrp-bootstrap/faucet
2. Proposes fresh Falcon wallets via wallet_propose (admin RPC)
3. Funds wallets from faucet (rwzhiWW4GYK2sQVR5Lw4iDpYLANB5krJXY, ~390k FALCON)
4. Signs and submits via docker exec qxrp-full curl -> admin :5005 / public :6005
5. Waits for validated ledger confirmation per tx

Wallet roles (liquidation script):

Role	Source	Purpose
Borrower	wallet_propose	LoanSet permissionless borrow
Liquidator	wallet_propose	Third-party LoanManage default (proves no broker needed)
Price dumper	Faucet account	AMM swap: sell FALCON -> F-USDC (Payment + tfPartialPayment)

Validator fleet accounts are **not** used for E2E - bonded FALCON and key isolation make the faucet the correct whale account on the coordinator.

1.7.4 7.4 Test A - Permissionless borrow + repay [PASS]

Script: lend-e2e-permissionless.py

Flow:

```
fund lender + borrower (2000 FALCON each)
-> trust lines (QUC / F-USDC)
-> issuer mint F-USDC (30 lender / 15 borrower)
-> VaultDeposit 20 F-USDC OR supply_skip if vault AssetsAvailable >= 10
-> LoanSet: 5 F-USDC principal, FALCON collateral @ 1.5 HF (+5% buffer)
-> LoanPay: full installment rounded UP to 6 dp
```

Loan terms (script):

Field	Value
PrincipalRequested	5 F-USDC
InterestRate	500 tenth-bips (5% APR)
PaymentInterval	86400 s
PaymentTotal	1
GracePeriod	3600 s
Flags	tfLoanOverpayment (0x00010000)
Collateral	ceil(5 x 1.5 / AMM_price x 1.05) FALCON

Representative PASS run (2026-07-14):

Wallet	Address
Lender	rUW5jpzLpEbfZ9GwpUk4Gs9iqoon4zTtY8
Borrower	rPxzyo4FdL7Pt7LekxpvTLTK2bLHZQBum8

Step	Tx hash	Result
Borrow 5 F-USDC (875 FALCON collateral)	78E3A2528B1C40FD09082D6249B65FC6EE1B0E9F16F8806E3E20F3FF81AC172	tecSUCCESSFUL
Repay 5.000069 F-USDC	93B058510F90402CD34F12BF83C83BBD6F684C65D78ED5849AF3310892097E719	tecSUCCESSFUL

Repay lesson: PeriodicPayment on-chain is 5.000068493150794935. Paying principal only (5) or truncated interest -> tecINSUFFICIENT_PAYMENT. Portal and script use **ceil to 6 decimal places (5.000069)** - matches “Pay full amount” in UI.

Supply skip: When vault AssetsAvailable >= principal + buffer, script skips VaultDeposit to avoid intermittent tecINVARIANT_FAILED on repeated small deposits into a large vault (~255 F-USDC available at time of testing).

1.7.5 7.5 Test B - Permissionless liquidation (HF breach) [PASS]

Script: lend-e2e-liquidation.py

Flow:

```
fund borrower + liquidator
-> borrower trust line
-> LoanSet @ minimum 1.5 HF (no 5% buffer)
-> faucet trust line (receive F-USDC from AMM dumps)
```

```
-> faucet AMM dumps (sell FALCON for F-USDC until HF < 1.1)
-> liquidator LoanManage tfLoanDefault
-> assert lsfLoanDefault + liquidator FALCON balance += collateral
```

Health factor math (matches on-chain loanHealthFactorBps):

HF = (collateral_FALCON x AMM_FUSDC_per_FALCON) / debt_FUSDC
 Liquidatable when HF < 1.1 (11,000 bps)

AMM dump mechanism: Self-Payment from faucet to faucet:

- **SendMax:** FALCON drops to sell
- **Amount:** max F-USDC to receive (must be large - **not** 1 USDC or price barely moves)
- **DeliverMin:** slippage floor
- **Flags:** tfPartialPayment (0x00020000)

Representative PASS run (2026-07-14, latest):

Wallet	Address
Borrower	r3XK65UbcEhsif3UjWbqNdKeD28TBeSc62
Liquidator	rJM5vq5umHp82iztWHSZySAoUSMuD5VbgT
Price dumper	rwzhiWW4GYK2sQVR5Lw4iDpYLANB5krJXY (faucet)

Step	HF / price	Tx hash	Result
Borrow 5 F-USDC, 1928 FALCON	HF 1.501 @ 0.003892	0834FB47C0FB9CDE0D32E57FCB87660E58D31A972BDB07FDF97C3601	
AMM dump 4000 FALCON	HF 1.231 @ 0.003194	43E459BC0FB5C36B5D0CFAE7053E190E59E40A72A4B7F5C8603B17D	
AMM dump 8000 FALCON	HF 0.856 @ 0.002219	989B04758E4BC7AFE598B734965BCE4E8DA99CF002BFFF854E88985	
Liquidator default	-	BA1C8431CEBDE5812DC9315BDE6B36CF854FCF0A592C0911303A3949	

Post-liquidation: Liquidator FALCON **2000 -> 3928** (+1928 collateral). Loan AE6D230E... flagged lsfLoanDefault.

On-chain settlement (defaultPermissionlessLoan in LoanManage.cpp):

1. FALCON collateral transferred from broker pseudo-account to **liquidator** (account_ on LoanManage)
2. Vault **AssetsAvailable** credited by collateral value at AMM price (capped at debt owed)
3. Vault **AssetsTotal** reduced by any F-USDC shortfall
4. Loan debt fields zeroed; lsfLoanDefault set

1.7.6 7.6 HF monitor daemon [PASS]

Service: qxrp-lend-hf-monitor.service on coordinator

Binary: /var/lib/qxrp-lending/lend-hf-monitor.py

Interval: 60 s loop

State: /var/lib/qxrp-lending/hf_monitor_state.json

Actions (permissionless loans):

Condition	LoanManage flag
HF < 1.1	tfLoanImpair
HF < 1.1 or payment past grace	tfLoanDefault
Impaired + HF >= 1.1	tfLoanUnimpair

Broker secret loaded from `stables_state.json liquidity_provider.falcon_secret` or `TESTNET_LENDING_BROKER_SECRET`.
For permissionless default, **any account** may submit - daemon uses broker owner for legacy loans; E2E uses a random liquidator wallet.

1.7.7 7.7 Portal session (2026-07-10, legacy broker path)

Wallet: `rwYXAXe7unkEwPVFWMbyzXE2ajG3juqR`

Step	Result	Notes
Vault deposit	[PASS]	100 F-USDC
AMM create	[PASS]	15,000 FALCON + 150 F-USDC
Borrow 10 F-USDC	[PASS]	Legacy <code>LoanSet</code> + broker co-sign
Repay 10.000137 F-USDC	[PASS]	Ledger 30899 , tx <code>71307F0B...</code>

1.7.8 7.8 E2E coverage matrix

Scenario	Coordinator script	Portal	Status
Vault supply	[PASS] (optional step)	[PASS]	PASS
Permissionless borrow	[PASS]	[PASS]	PASS
Full installment repay	[PASS]	[PASS]	PASS
HF breach liquidation	[PASS]	Risk monitor UI	PASS
Payment-default liquidation	HF monitor	-	Not E2E'd (24h interval)
Broker legacy borrow + co-sign	-	[PASS]	PASS (2026-07-10)
<code>ClaimLPReward</code>	-	[PASS]	Prior sessions
Impair / unimpair only	HF monitor	-	Daemon logic; not isolated E2E

1.7.9 7.9 Live pool state (post-liquidation E2E, 2026-07-14)

Metric	Value
AMM FALCON	~47,984 FALCON
AMM F-USDC	~106.5 F-USDC
AMM price	~0.002219 F-USDC/FALCON (depressed by repeated E2E dumps)
Vault <code>AssetsTotal</code>	~257.6 F-USDC
Vault <code>AssetsAvailable</code>	~247.6 F-USDC

1.8 8. Operations guide

1.8.1 8.1 Bootstrap (coordinator)

```
bash scripts/enable-lending-fleet.sh --wait
# After lending-permissionless docker image is built:
bash scripts/enable-lending-permissionless-fleet.sh --wait
python3 scripts/issue-testnet-stables.py
python3 scripts/bootstrap-testnet-lending.py
```

HF monitor:

```
bash scripts/deploy-lend-hf-monitor.sh
python3 /var/lib/qxrp-lending/lend-hf-monitor.py --once --dry-run
journalctl -u qxrp-lend-hf-monitor -f
```

E2E regression (coordinator):

```
python3 scripts/lend-e2e-permissionless.py
python3 scripts/lend-e2e-liquidation.py
```

1.8.2 8.2 Vercel / portal env

Variable	Required for	Notes
Testnet RPC	All	Overview + submit
TESTNET_LENDING_BROKER_SECRET	Legacy co-sign + HF daemon	Remove after permissionless live
SIGNER_PROXY_URL / SIGNER_PROXY_TOKEN	Legacy co-sign + daemon	
LEND_HF_MONITOR_TOKEN	HF monitor -> loan-manage	Optional bearer auth

1.9 9. Security model

Asset	Model
User Falcon seed	Passkey-encrypted in IndexedDB; browser-only signing
Broker owner secret	Server-only; legacy co-sign + daemon - not needed for permissionless borrow
Permissionless borrow	No gatekeeper; collateral + HF enforced on-ledger
Co-sign route	Testnet-only, origin-checked, LoanSet only (legacy)

1.10 10. Known gaps

1.10.1 Remaining testnet / portal

- Payment-default liquidation E2E (wait for `PaymentInterval` + `GracePeriod` - impractical in quick scripts)
- Portal “Liquidate” button for third-party liquidators (today: HF monitor, `loan-manage` API, or coordinator scripts)
- Vercel redeploy; remove `TESTNET_LENDING_BROKER_SECRET` if legacy co-sign retired
- Live APY from epoch `EmissionRate` in overview
- AMM price recovery after repeated E2E dumps (pool depth testing)

1.10.2 Mainnet considerations

- Permissionless collateral-only borrow - no broker operator
 - Do not bootstrap-mint F-USDC into vault (bridge-only)
 - Liquidation under thin AMM depth / manipulation resistance
 - HF monitor liveness and MEV on `LoanManage` default
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1.11 11. File reference

1.11.1 Portal (`qXRP-faucet-wallet`)

- `src/app/lend/page.tsx` - Lend page orchestration
- `src/components/lend/LendPanels.tsx` - UI panels
- `src/app/api/lend/overview/route.ts` - Overview aggregation
- `src/app/api/lend/borrow-preflight/route.ts` - Borrow preflight
- `src/app/api/lend/loan-manage/route.ts` - `LoanManage` submit
- `src/app/api/lend/cosign/route.ts` - Legacy broker co-sign
- `src/lib/falcon-lend-tx-sign.ts` - Tx builders
- `src/lib/lend-borrow-errors.ts` - Pre-flight + error copy
- `src/lib/lend-collateral.ts` - HF math, min collateral
- `src/lib/lend-loan-manage.ts` - `LoanManage` action helpers
- `public/config/lending.json` - On-chain IDs + terms

1.11.2 Protocol (`qXRP`)

- `src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanSet.cpp` - Borrow + permissionless path
 - `src/libxrpl/tx/transactors/lending/LoanManage.cpp` - Impair/default + `defaultPermissionlessLoan`
 - `src/libxrpl/ledger/helpers/LendingHelpers.cpp` - HF bps, collateral checks, AMM price
 - `scripts/enable-lending-permissionless-fleet.sh` - Amendment activation
 - `scripts/lend-hf-monitor.py` - HF enforcement daemon
 - `scripts/deploy-lend-hf-monitor.sh` - systemd install for HF monitor
 - `scripts/lend-e2e-permissionless.py` - Coordinator E2E: borrow + repay
 - `scripts/lend-e2e-liquidation.py` - Coordinator E2E: HF breach + default
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1.12 12. Conclusion

Falcon Ledger lending is a **verified vertical slice** on testnet:

- **LendingPermissionless** enabled fleet-wide; collateral-only `LoanSet` without broker co-sign
- **Coordinator E2E** confirms borrow, repay (6 dp ceil), and third-party liquidation via AMM price shock
- **HF monitor** running on coordinator for automated `LoanManage` enforcement
- **Portal** /lend wired for permissionless borrow, HF display, risk monitor, and preflight APIs

The most common user-facing confusion - **tecINSUFFICIENT_PAYMENT while holding ample F-USDC** - is a protocol requirement to pay **principal + interest/fees per installment**. The portal and E2E scripts surface the exact due amount (5.000069 for a 5 F-USDC single-payment loan at 5% APR).

Next priorities: Vercel redeploy, optional portal liquidator UX, payment-default E2E, and mainnet hardening under realistic AMM depth.